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ABSTRACT 
Eric Sampson: Can We Rationally Believe Conciliationism? 
(Under the Direction of Geoffrey Sayre-McCord) 
 
Conciliationists hold that, when an agent learns that an epistemic peer disagrees with her 
about p, she is rationally required to suspend judgment about p. Conciliationism has a well-known 
self-undermining problem (SUP): Conciliationism is itself controversial among philosophers. It thus 
seems to entail that it is irrational for conciliationists to believe their own view. Conciliationists have 
argued, in various ways, that this is not so. I argue that their defenses fail for the same reason: they 
depend for their success on philosophical claims that are also the subject of disagreement among 
conciliationists’ epistemic peers. It is therefore irrational, by conciliationists’ lights, to believe the 
claims conciliationists employ in their defenses. It is thus irrational, by conciliationists’ standards, to 
believe that their defenses succeed. So we cannot rationally believe Conciliationism. I argue, 
moreover, that there is excellent reason to think that this problem will afflict any future defenses of 
Conciliationism, too. 
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1. Conciliationism and its Self-Undermining Problem 
Conciliatory views in epistemology comprise a family of views about how agents ought to 
revise their doxastic attitudes toward a proposition p upon learning that an apparent epistemic peer 
disagrees with them about p.1 An agent A’s epistemic peer about p is, roughly, someone whose 
epistemic credentials with respect to p are approximately equal to A’s, where the level of an agent’s 
epistemic credentials depends on how intelligent, well-informed, unbiased, honest, and so on that 
agent is.2 Conciliatory views agree on the following thesis:   
Conciliationism’s Core (credence): If an agent A learns that an apparent 
epistemic peer, B, disagrees with her about p, then A is rationally required to adjust 
her credence in p significantly in the direction of B’s.  
 
The result will often be that A and B each ought to have a credence in p somewhere in the vicinity 
of 0.5—maybe a bit more, maybe a bit less depending on the circumstances. If we formulate the 
core claim in terms of full-(dis)belief, then conciliatory views agree that 
Conciliationism’s Core (full-belief):  If A learns that an apparent epistemic peer, 
B, disagrees with her about p, then A is rationally required to suspend judgment 
about p.3 
                                                          
1 Conciliatory views are meant to apply to cases of disagreement with epistemic superiors as well, but I will follow the 
literature in ignoring this complication. Defenders of conciliatory views include Bogardus (2009), Christensen (2007, 
2009, 2013), Elga (2007, 2010), Feldman (2006, 2010), Kornblith (2010, 2013), Matheson (2009), Pittard (2015), and 
Vavova (2015). 
 
2 It’s often said that epistemic peers must be roughly equal in both information (relevant to the dispute) and epistemic 
virtue. There are various (more precise) accounts of epistemic peerhood, but none of them will matter for my purposes. 
You may import your favorite account of epistemic peerhood throughout. 
 
3 For simplicity, I will speak mostly in terms of full-belief, full-disbelief, and suspension of belief. As I have noted, many 
conciliationists prefer to speak in terms of credences or degrees of belief. I will not assume that there is any 
straightforward relation between full (dis)belief and credences. I will not assume, for instance, that the attitude of having 
a credence of 0.5 toward p is identical to the attitude of suspension of belief about p. And I will not assume that there is 
some threshold such that once an agent’s credence in a proposition rises above it, the agent has moved from suspension 
of belief to full-belief in that proposition. Nevertheless, I will assume that there is some fairly intuitive relation between 
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Call anyone who accepts either version of Conciliationism’s Core a conciliationist and call their view 
about peer disagreement Conciliationism.4 
Conciliationism is a popular view, but it has not won universal acceptance. Some 
epistemologists hold a version of a competing view, known widely as the Steadfast View (see, e.g., 
Bergmann (2009), Decker (2014), Kelly (2005, 2010), Titelbaum (2014), van Inwagen (2010), 
Weatherson (2013), Wedgewood (2010), Weintraub (2013)).5 According to steadfasters, 
disagreement about p between epistemic peers is rarely sufficient, all by itself, to rationally require 
either peer to suspend judgment about p. Thus, Conciliationism is itself the subject of disagreement 
among excellent philosophers. This fact poses an obvious problem for Conciliationism. If, as 
virtually all conciliationists admit, conciliationists have many epistemic peers who disagree with them 
about the truth of Conciliationism, then it seems to be irrational, by conciliationists’ lights, for 
conciliationists to believe (or be confident in) their own view.6 Call this the self-undermining problem 
(SUP) for Conciliationism.7 
                                                          
the attitudes of full (dis)belief and credences, such that what I say in terms of full (dis)belief can be translated into the 
language of credences. 
4 I suspect that anyone who accepts Conciliationism’s Core (credence) will also accept Conciliationism’s core (full-belief) 
and vice-versa, but the argument of this paper will apply to anyone who accepts either thesis. 
 
5 Decker (2014) doesn’t actually defend the Steadfast View. Rather, he rejects Conciliationism and remains silent about 
which view he endorses. But the point for now is that he, like many other excellent philosophers, rejects 
Conciliationism. 
 
6 One might attempt (somewhat desperately, in my view) to avoid the force of the SUP by insisting that steadfasters are 
not the epistemic peers of conciliationists. This is not a popular strategy among conciliationists for the following reason. 
In order for this strategy to succeed, one would need to adopt a very narrow conception of epistemic peerhood such 
that some of the very best epistemologists in philosophy do not count as epistemic peers to conciliationists. But if one 
has such a narrow conception of epistemic peerhood, then the rational requirement described by Conciliationism would 
almost never apply to agents like us. For, given such a narrow conception of peerhood, one would almost never 
encounter an epistemic peer. Thus, one might attempt to avoid the force of the SUP by adopting a very narrow 
conception of peerhood, but one would thereby rob Conciliationism of much, or all, of its philosophical interest. 
Conciliationism, even if true and rationally believable, would almost never apply. And it certainly wouldn’t have any 
implications for our moral, political, religious, and other important philosophical views, as many have thought. 
7 I am assuming here, and throughout the paper, that conciliationists and steadfasters are roughly equally confident in 
their views. It is, in principle, possible that disagreement about Conciliationism would not render it irrational for 
Conciliationists to believe their view in the face of peer disagreement about it. If, for example, conciliationists had, on 
the whole, very high credence in their view, while steadfasters had, on the whole, only middling credence in their view, 
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Here’s David Christensen, one of Conciliationism’s most prominent defenders, putting the 
problem in his own words: 
I, as a conciliationist, know full well that several excellent philosophers oppose my 
view; in fact, it seems to me that opinion on Conciliationism is presently divided 
roughly evenly. By my own lights, then, I should not be highly confident in 
Conciliationism (2009: 762). 
 
Christensen replies that the mere fact that Conciliationism potentially self-undermines is no cause for 
concern for conciliationists; for any plausible view about the epistemic significance of peer 
disagreement will have to grapple with that problem (2009: 762). But what about the charge that, 
given the actual distribution of opinion about Conciliationism among epistemologists, 
Conciliationism actually self-undermines? After all, it is this latter issue that seems most pressing for 
conciliationists but not for steadfasters. Christensen writes: 
Indeed, it seems to me those of us who find ourselves strongly drawn toward 
Conciliationism in these contentious times should not be confident that 
Conciliationism is correct. (Of course, we may still work hard in producing and 
disseminating arguments for the view, hoping to hasten thereby the day when 
epistemic conditions will brighten, consensus will blossom, and all will rationally and 
whole-heartedly embrace Conciliationism.)  (2009: 763) 
 
So Christensen concedes that, given the current state of the debate, conciliationists cannot rationally 
believe, or be confident in, their view. 8 
                                                          
then, even after conciliating, conciliationists might be rationally permitted to have a relatively high credence in 
Conciliationism. While this is possible in principle, I assume, along with everyone else in this debate, that, as a matter of 
contingent fact, credences are not distributed this way. 
8As far as I know, Christensen has not changed his mind about this. Here he is, in 2013, four years after the passage 
quoted above:  
 
Now as it turns out, I’m also aware of the current controversy about disagreement, and know that a number 
of epistemologists reject CV [conciliatory views] in favor of positions toward the “steadfast” end of the 
spectrum: they hold that one may (often, at least in large measure) maintain one's confidence in one's initial 
beliefs despite knowledge of disagreement by those who seem, independent of the disagreement, to be as well 
positioned as oneself to arrive at accurate views on the disputed matter. I also quite reasonably respect 
epistemologists who hold steadfast views and reject CV. Insofar as I practice what I preach, it seems that CV 
requires me to become much less confident in CV as well. 
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 Other conciliationists, however, are more optimistic. These conciliationists have offered a 
variety of defenses of Conciliationism in the face of the SUP. The conclusion of each defense is that 
conciliationists are rationally permitted to believe their view, even in the face of peer disagreement 
about it. In what follows, I argue that all of these defenses fail for roughly the same reason: each 
defense depends for its success on philosophical claims that are themselves the subject of 
disagreement among conciliationists’ epistemic peers. It is therefore irrational, by conciliationists’ 
own lights, to believe the claims they employ in their defenses. It is therefore irrational to believe 
that these defenses succeed and irrational to continue believing Conciliationism in the face of peer 
disagreement about it. 
Things get worse for conciliationists—or so I shall argue. There is good reason to think that 
the problem I am identifying for existing defenses of Conciliationism against the SUP will likely 
afflict any future defenses, too. After all, any future defense will likely appeal to epistemic principles 
along the way. But given the pervasiveness of disagreement in epistemology, it seems highly unlikely 
that any plausible defense could be carried out by appeal to all and only uncontroversial epistemic 
principles. If this is correct, then, not only is it now irrational to believe Conciliationism, it will likely 
be irrational for a very long time—for at least as long as anyone reading this is alive. 
 
                                                          
This puts the advocate of CV in a situation that's puzzling in a number of ways. For one thing, it would seem 
that, in the present epistemological climate, at least, CV has the property that one cannot rationally believe it 
(at least very strongly), even if it's true. But this in itself isn’t obviously mysterious or deeply problematic. 
After all, there would seem to be other situations—ones in which all epistemologists accept CV, for 
instance—in which one could rationally believe in CV.  So CV isn’t obviously intrinsically impossible to 
believe rationally. The present situation might, for all we’ve seen so far, simply be the sort of situation we 
confront on all kinds of topics all the time: one in which the truth on some matter is not rationally believable, 
because our evidence, misleadingly, points away from it (2013: 78). 
The only difference is that Christensen, in 2013, seems more inclined to downplay the seriousness of the problem 
for Conciliationism than he earlier did. But the concession that, in today’s climate, Conciliationism cannot be 
rationally believed remains. And it is this point that concerns me now. 
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2. What’s the Philosophical Significance? 
If the argument in this paper succeeds, it would not entail that Conciliationism is false. Nor 
would it entail that we ought to reject (i.e., believe the negation of) Conciliationism. One might 
wonder, then, why it’s philosophically significant that we cannot rationally believe Conciliationism. 
First, many have found Conciliationism interesting because it seems to have clear 
implications for our philosophical views outside of epistemology. No matter which side of the 
following debates you’re on, you almost certainly have an epistemic peer who disagrees with you 
about 
• the moral (im)permissibility of eating meat 
• consequentialism vs. non-consequentialism in ethics 
• compatibilism vs. incompatibilism 
• theism vs. atheism  
• internalism vs. externalism about epistemic justification 
• internalism vs. externalism about reasons for action 
 
and many, many other debates in philosophy. If so, then Conciliationism implies that, given the 
current distribution of opinion among your epistemic peers on these issues, you ought to suspend 
judgment about them (if you haven’t already).9 If, however, we cannot rationally believe 
Conciliationism, then we ought not to suspend judgment about these issues on the basis of a belief 
in Conciliationism. For, if it’s irrational to believe Conciliationism, then it would be irrational to 
revise our beliefs and credences on the basis of a belief in Conciliationism. 
                                                          
9 I don’t mean to be objecting to Conciliationism here. I’m just describing one significant implication the view would 
have if it were true and we could rationally believe it. If you’re like me, you find it plausible that we ought to suspend 
judgment about some of these issues. But I think that we sometimes ought to suspend judgment because the first-order 
evidence is inconclusive. Conciliationists, however, think that, even if the first-order evidence conclusively favors one 
view over the other, we still ought to suspend judgment about the issue because the higher-order evidence—namely, the 
disagreement of our epistemic peers—rationally requires us to suspend judgment. 
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Second, philosophical arguments from Conciliationism to skepticism (or agnosticism) about 
a certain subject matter are becoming increasingly prevalent (see, e.g., Feldman (2007), Kornblith 
(2013), Matheson (2016), McGrath (2007), Rowland (2017), Sinnott-Armstrong (2007), Vavova 
(2014)). But if we cannot rationally believe Conciliationism, then we should not be moved by these 
arguments. Since each argument employs Conciliationism as a premise on the way to their skeptical 
conclusions, and we cannot rationally believe Conciliationism, we cannot rationally believe at least 
one of the premises in these arguments. And we should not be moved by arguments that employ 
premises that we know we cannot rationally believe. So these arguments cannot justify their skeptical 
conclusions. 
In short: If the argument of this paper is sound, then even if Conciliationism is true, it cannot be 
put to much interesting philosophical use.  
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3. Why Existing Defenses Fail 
In this section, I’ll canvass three recent attempts to defend Conciliationism against the 
SUP.10 In each case, I argue, the proposed solution depends on controversial philosophical claims. 
Thus, we cannot, by conciliationists’ lights, rationally believe that these defenses succeed. 
3.1. Bogardus’s Direct Acquaintance Defense 
The most straightforward defense of Conciliationism against the SUP comes from Tomas 
Bogardus (2009). He argues that the truth of Conciliationism can be known by direct acquaintance 
on the basis of rational intuition. Thus, any apparent epistemic peer who denies Conciliationism can 
be demoted from the status of apparent epistemic peer on the grounds that they deny a proposition 
known by direct acquaintance. He writes, 
[T]he antecedent of the Equal-Weight View [that some agent is an apparent 
epistemic peer] might not be satisfied in cases involving knowledge from that 
unmediated access to the truth of propositions sometimes afforded by rational 
intuition. And it’s plausible that the Equal-Weight View is itself a deliverance of 
rational intuition . . . With further reflection, I think, one can come to just see the 
truth of the View – not only does it seem obvious, but upon further reflection it just is 
obvious (2009: 333). 
 
Clearly, this defense succeeds only if the following principle is both true and can be rationally 
believed. 
Obvious: The Equal Weight View—one version of Conciliationism—is obvious or 
known on the basis of rational intuition. 
 
                                                          
10 Indeed, these are the only three attempts to address the SUP of which I am aware. There have been several attempts 
to respond to a similar charge, namely, that Conciliationism is incoherent and therefore false (Matheson (2015), 
Christensen (2013)). But these replies have nothing to say about the charge that, given our current philosophical climate, 
Conciliationism cannot be rationally believed. 
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Let’s grant, for the sake of argument, that Obvious is true. Still, if we cannot rationally believe it, 
then we cannot rationally demote an apparent epistemic peer from that status on the basis of a belief 
in Obvious. And, unfortunately for conciliationists, Obvious cannot—by conciliationists’ 
standards—be rationally believed since it is itself controversial. Not only do many steadfasters deny 
Obvious, but so also do many conciliationists.11 
 One might suggest that Obvious, too, is obvious or known on the basis of rational intuition. 
If this were true, then conciliationists could demote any apparent epistemic peer who disagrees with 
them about Obvious from the status of apparent epistemic peer. The trouble is that it is even more 
controversial that Obvious is obvious or known on the basis of rational intuition than Obvious 
itself. Conciliationism thus entails that it’s not rational to believe that Obvious is obvious or known 
by rational intuition. One might attempt to make the same move yet again—i.e., insist that it’s 
obvious that Obvious is obvious. But I take it that no conciliationist would want to pursue this 
desperate strategy. So Bogardus’s defense of Conciliationism against the SUP fails because its 
success depends on Obvious being both true and rationally believable. But, given that Obvious is 
controversial among excellent philosophers (both steadfasters and conciliationists alike), it cannot be 
rationally believed—not even by conciliationists’ standards.  
3.2. Elga’s Self-Exempting Conciliationism 
Perhaps the most famous defense of Conciliationism against the SUP comes from Adam 
Elga (2010). Elga employs a self-exempting strategy to defend Conciliationism: He argues that we 
rationally ought to conciliate in the face of peer disagreement, except when the disputed proposition 
                                                          
11 Might the conciliationist rationally believe Obvious if her initial credence in Obvious—prior to the disagreement 
about it—is very high? No—not given the actual credences of philosophers toward Obvious. No matter how confident 
the conciliationist is that Obvious is true, there are steadfasters (and even other conciliationists) who have an equally 
high (or roughly equally high) credence that Obvious is false. If so, then any plausible form of Conciliationism will 
require that the conciliationist’s credence in Obvious be somewhere near 0.5 upon discovering peer disagreement about 
Obvious. 
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is Conciliationism itself. If the disputed proposition is Conciliationism, then we ought to remain 
steadfast in believing—indeed, have a credence of 1 in—Conciliationism. The resulting view is  
 
Elga’s Self-Exempting Conciliationism (ESEC):  
(1) Conciliationism:  If A learns that an apparent epistemic peer, B, disagrees with 
her about p, then A is rationally required to adjust her credence in p significantly 
in the direction of B’s, 
(2) unless p is Conciliationism. If p is Conciliationism, then A ought to remain 
steadfast in her confidence—indeed have a credence of 1—in p. 
 
Priority number one for Elga is to explain how ESEC’s second clause does not render ESEC 
objectionably ad hoc. Elga’s answer is that Conciliationism—ESEC’s first clause—is an inductive 
method. That is, Conciliationism offers advice about how agents rationally ought to regulate their 
doxastic attitudes when confronted with certain courses of experience. And all correct inductive 
methods, Elga argues, must be dogmatic—i.e., recommend credence 1—about their own 
correctness. So, for any correct inductive method M, M will never advise an agent to stop believing 
M. 
To further motivate ESEC’s second clause, Elga borrows an example from David Lewis 
(1971: 55) involving the magazine Consumer Reports, which rates appliances and gives 
recommendations for which ones to buy. Elga imagines that Consumer Reports also rates and 
recommends other consumer ratings magazines. It would be incoherent, Elga says, for Consumer 
Reports to recommend a competitor magazine’s ratings over itself, where a competitor magazine is 
one that offers contrary appliance recommendations. For if Consumer Reports did recommend the 
ratings of a competitor magazine, Smart Shopper say, and Consumer Reports advises you to buy only 
Toaster1, Smart Shopper would advise you to buy only Toaster2. But now Consumer Reports would have 
given conflicting advice. You cannot possibly do both of the things Consumer Reports has advised you 
to do. So, to give coherent advice, Elga argues, Consumer Reports must rate itself highest of all the 
competitor ratings. It must advise you to trust it over any other magazine. 
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The same applies to inductive methods, Elga argues. If an inductive method M is to offer 
coherent advice, M must advise you to trust M over any other method. So, in order to give coherent 
advice, Conciliationism—an inductive method—must be dogmatic about its own correctness. It 
must regard itself as the best method—indeed, the best possible method—for dealing with 
disagreement among epistemic peers. If Elga is correct about this, then he will have identified a 
justification, independent of merely avoiding the SUP, for conciliationists to insist on being steadfast 
about disagreements over Conciliationism but not about disagreements over other propositions. 
But we do not need to venture outside the conciliationist camp to find disagreement about 
Elga’s crucial claims. David Christensen has criticized Elga’s self-exempting Conciliationism, and it 
is worth quoting him at length.  
I think that there is something unsatisfying about [ESEC]… Suppose, that is, that I follow 
[Conciliationism] and remain absolutely confident in its correctness, despite the fact that it's 
rejected by many epistemologists I respect, and even rate as my superiors in philosophical 
skill. How should I view my own reasoning on this topic? Should I think that while I’m 
generally only moderately reliable when I think about philosophy, nevertheless when I think 
about arguments for general conciliation, and for not being conciliatory about conciliation, 
I’m especially immune from error? That seems extremely dubious. There is nothing about 
this particular topic that would make my way of thinking about it special, or especially 
immune from my usual sort of blunders. 
Should I count myself just lucky, then? This seems more natural: given my general fallibility 
in thinking philosophically, it would indeed be lucky if I, rather than all those more-talented 
philosophers who reject [Conciliationism], am the one who is right this time. . .On what 
basis could I conclude that I’m the one who got lucky, rather than those who reject 
[Conciliationism]?. . .  
Thus it doesn’t seem to me that it would be rational for me to be highly confident (let alone 
certain) that I’m either very lucky or using especially reliable methods in thinking about the 
topic of rational responses to disagreement. And so [ESEC], despite fitting in a natural way 
with the [SUP], does not seem to me to provide a satisfactory solution to our problem (2013: 
88-89). 
 
We can glean from this passage two claims that Elga presupposes but that Christensen denies. The 
point of what follows is not to show that Christensen’s criticisms of Elga’s defense are correct 
(though I’m inclined to think that they are). Rather, the point is to show that Elga and others who 
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embrace ESEC have epistemic peers—indeed, fellow conciliationists—who disagree with them 
about the claims on which Elga’s defense depends. 
For Elga’s defense to succeed, it’s not enough for ESEC to be true. We must also be able to 
rationally believe it. Perhaps Elga has given some reason to think that ESEC is more likely to be true 
than unrestricted Conciliationism. But, even if Elga is correct on this point, he will not have 
established 
Rational Dogmatism (RD):  It is rationally permissible to believe, or have 
credence 1 in, Conciliationism.12 
 
Return to the Consumer Reports analogy. Elga may be right that, to give coherent advice, Consumer 
Reports must regard its appliance ratings as the most reliable among all existing appliance ratings. 
That, however, does not entail that it is rational to believe that Consumer Reports has the most reliable 
ratings. If it did, then every magazine would be justified in being dogmatic about its own ratings, since 
it is true of every magazine that, to give coherent advice, it must regard its own ratings as best. But 
there are clear cases in which it would be irrational for the editors of a magazine to believe that their 
own magazine’s ratings are best. 
Imagine a magazine in the same business as Consumer Reports called Darts Magazine. Darts 
makes its recommendations by putting a photograph of each appliance on a wall, blindfolding an 
employee, and having them throw a dart in the general direction of the wall. Whichever photograph 
the dart hits on the first throw is the toaster that Darts rates as the best toaster. Whichever toaster 
the dart hits on the second throw is the one that gets rated second best. And so on for all the 
toasters, microwaves, etc. Now, to give coherent advice, Darts must regard its appliance ratings as 
the most reliable of all existing ratings. But that obviously does not entail that it is rational to believe, 
                                                          
12 Notice that RD is not identical to Conciliationism. Rather, it is a claim about the epistemic status of belief in 
Conciliationism. 
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or to be confident that, Darts’s advice is the best out there. Darts’s advice is worthless and everyone 
knows it—even the Darts employees generating the ratings! 
The lesson for ESEC is this: even if Elga is correct that, to give coherent advice, 
Conciliationism must be dogmatic about its own correctness, it does not follow that that dogmatism 
is rationally permissible. It may be that, just as being dogmatic about Darts’s correctness is necessary 
for giving coherent advice but irrational, so being dogmatic about Conciliationism’s correctness is 
necessary for giving coherent advice but irrational. In other words, being dogmatic about 
Conciliationism may help one avoid incoherence, but not overconfidence. That, I take it, is 
Christensen’s point when he says that, in being dogmatic about Conciliationism, conciliationists are 
committed to thinking either that they are infallible when it comes to reasoning about peer 
disagreement or that they are just incredibly lucky to have happened to believe the correct view. 
Both suggestions are dubious. So a dogmatic conciliationist is overconfident. Such a person’s 
credence that their view about peer disagreement is correct is irrationally high and nothing Elga says 
in defense of his self-exempting Conciliationism suggests otherwise. 
The point, then, is this: if Christensen is correct, then the claim that Elga relies on to 
immunize Conciliationism from the SUP—RD—is false. And its falsity undermines the case that 
Elga makes for ESEC. But ESEC is in trouble even if Christensen’s diagnosis is mistaken. Even if 
RD can be defended against the case Christensen makes against it, RD is itself the subject of 
controversy among excellent philosophers. It is therefore irrational to believe RD, even by Elga’s 
lights. So, it would be irrational to believe that Elga’s defense of Conciliationism against the SUP 
succeeds. 
There is another controversial claim on which Elga’s defense depends. As the long quote 
from Christensen above suggests, one of the central motivations for embracing Conciliationism is 
that it captures the intuitive thought that we are fallible reasoners. Our best efforts to discover the 
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truth often fail, even after we check our reasoning over, and over, and on that basis feel confident 
that we are correct. But, if one accepts Elga’s reply to the SUP, then one escapes the force of the 
SUP only by abandoning this motivating thought. As Christensen notes, in order to accept Elga’s 
reply, one must think either that one is infallible when it comes to reasoning about peer 
disagreement, or just incredibly lucky to have hit upon the correct view. But neither of these seems 
plausible, and neither is consistent with the considerations that make Conciliationism an attractive 
view in the first place. But, it seems clear that, in order for Elga’s defense to succeed, it must not 
give up on the central motivating thought behind Conciliationism—namely, that we are fallible 
reasoners. Thus, Elga’s defense depends on 
Motivation: ESEC is consistent with the central motivations for embracing 
Conciliationism in the first place. 
 
Elga’s reply to the SUP succeeds only if Motivation is true and we can rationally believe it. 
But, by Elga’s own lights, we cannot rationally believe it, since there is peer disagreement about that 
proposition. Christensen, and certainly many others—both steadfasters and conciliationists—deny 
it. So, even if Motivation is somehow true, Elga’s defense of Conciliationism against the SUP fails, 
since, by his own lights, neither he nor we can rationally believe Motivation.  
3.3. Pittard’s Resolute Conciliationism 
John Pittard (2015) employs a self-exempting strategy, too. He begins by noting that 
Conciliationism’s central requirement is to demonstrate some sort of deference to one’s epistemic 
equals and superiors (449). He argues that when a conciliationist faces peer disagreement about 
Conciliationism itself, a conciliationist may show deference to her interlocutor in two different ways. 
She may conciliate either at the level of her credence or at the level of her reasoning. 
To illustrate, suppose that Connie the conciliationist and Steph the steadfaster disagree about 
whether Conciliationism is true. Conciliationism says that Connie ought to conciliate. Connie might 
conciliate by significantly reducing her confidence in Conciliationism, thereby conciliating at the 
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level of her credence. (This is the standard way conciliationists have recommended we show epistemic 
deference to our epistemic peers.) Alternatively, Connie may conciliate at the level of her reasoning by 
adopting a steadfaster’s rationale—the rationale her dissenting interlocutor endorses—for 
responding to peer disagreements. Pittard argues that this latter form of conciliation (i.e., at the level 
of reasoning) represents a kind of epistemic deference no less than conciliation at the level of 
credence. When Connie conciliates at the level of reasoning, she refuses to rely on a rationale for 
belief revision that her epistemic peer contests. In this way, Pittard argues, she also shows epistemic 
deference. Thus, conciliation at the level of reasoning is consistent with the motivation for accepting 
Conciliationism in the first place. But notice that conciliating at the level of reasoning (by adopting a 
steadfaster’s rationale) would result in Connie’s remaining resolute in her endorsement of 
Conciliationism at the level of her credence. After all, Steph, with whom Connie disagrees and to 
whom Connie defers, would advise Connie to remain steadfast in the face of peer disagreements. 
Thus, Pittard argues, Connie is rationally permitted to remain resolute in her belief in 
Conciliationism. And this resolute Conciliationism, he argues, is neither objectionably ad hoc nor 
vulnerable to the SUP. 
If we can rationally believe the claims Pittard employs, then his defense will succeed in 
showing that conciliationists are rationally permitted to believe their own view, even in the face of 
peer disagreement about it. But there are two claims that we must be rationally permitted to believe 
in order for Pittard’s defense to succeed. And neither are rationally permissible, according to 
Conciliationism. 
By hypothesis, Connie is a conciliationist. She therefore rejects steadfast reasoning. And yet 
Pittard believes that it is both psychologically possible and rationally permissible for Connie to retain 
her belief in Conciliationism on the basis of a steadfaster’s rationale. Thus, Pittard presupposes that 
it is both psychologically possible and rationally permissible for an agent to form (or retain) a belief 
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on the basis of a claim that she does not believe, or on the basis of reasoning that she rejects. Here, 
then, is the first controversial claim: 
Possible: It is psychologically possible for an agent to form (or retain) a belief on 
the basis of a claim that she does not believe, or on the basis of reasoning that she 
rejects.  
 
Given what we know about philosophers, it seems likely that many of them (would) reject Possible. 
This is because the following principle seems quite plausible 
Acceptance: Necessarily, if A comes to believe (or retain a belief in) x on the basis 
of y, then A actually believes or accepts y—i.e., A takes y to be true, or correct, or 
valid, or the like. 
 
If Acceptance is correct, then Possible is false and it is psychologically impossible for Connie, or any 
conciliationist for that matter, to continue to believe Conciliationism on the basis of steadfast 
reasoning. 
While I’m inclined to think that Acceptance is true and Possible is false, the larger point is 
that, given what we know about philosophers, we can be highly confident that there are excellent 
philosophers who reject Possible (perhaps because they endorse Acceptance). If that is correct, then 
even on Pittard’s resolute brand of Conciliationism we ought to suspend judgment about Possible. 
But since Pittard’s defense succeeds only if we can rationally believe Possible, and, by Pittard’s lights, 
we rationally ought to suspend judgment about Possible, we cannot rationally believe that Pittard’s 
defense succeeds.  
But even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that it is psychologically possible for an agent 
to come to believe (or retain a belief in) a proposition on the basis of a claim that she does not 
believe, or on the basis of reasoning that she rejects, one might reasonably deny that it is rationally 
permissible for an agent to do so. Thus, Pittard’s defense also depends on  
Permissible: It is rationally permissible for an agent to form (or retain) a belief on 
the basis of a claim that she does not believe, or on the basis of reasoning that she 
rejects. 
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Again, I’m inclined to believe that Permissible is false. (Just imagine how you would react to 
someone who reports that they believe that p on the basis of q but they also reject q.) However, even 
if Permissible is true, it is nevertheless a highly controversial claim we can be confident that many 
excellent philosophers (would) reject. If that is correct, then, once again, conciliationists will have 
peers who disagree with them about one of the claims on which Pittard’s defense depends. By 
Pittard’s own lights, then we cannot rationally believe that crucial claim. Thus, by his own lights, his 
defense of Conciliationism against the SUP fails.  
 It might be suggested that, though Pittard’s defense fails in its current form, there is a way of 
developing his strategy that succeeds. Imagine Connie making the following speech upon 
discovering her disagreement with Steph. 
Notice, Steph, that, if your view (the Steadfast view) is correct, then it is rationally 
permissible for me to confidently hold my belief in Conciliationism in the face of 
peer disagreement about it. So, even if you’re right and I’m wrong about how to 
correctly respond to peer disagreement, I’m rationally permitted to believe 
Conciliationism. 
 
In other words, Connie is reasoning hypothetically. She is supposing, for the sake of argument, that 
her interlocutor’s view is correct and deriving the conclusion that she is rationally permitted to 
believe her view in the face of peer disagreement about it. One might think, therefore, that, if 
Connie’s belief is rational even if her dissenting interlocutor’s view is correct, then Connie is 
rationally permitted to believe her own view. If this is the proper way to understand Pittard’s 
defense, then it does not require Connie to believe (or retain her belief in) Conciliationism on the basis 
of a steadfaster’s rationale. It only requires a bit of hypothetical reasoning. Thus, none of the above 
criticisms of Pittard’s defense would apply. 
 Conciliationists should not be comforted by Connie’s speech or the proposed revision to 
Pittard’s defense. It is true that, if the Steadfast View is correct, Connie is permitted to believe 
Conciliationism in the face of controversy about it. But if the Steadfast View is correct, then 
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Conciliationism is false. So Connie is rationally permitted to retain her belief in Conciliationism only 
if her view is false. Moreover, we should not forget: Connie is a conciliationist. So we should ask: 
What if your view is correct, Connie? What follows about the rational permissibility of believing 
Conciliationism then? The answer is the same as before: if Conciliationism is true, then, given the 
controversy about it, Connie is not rationally permitted to retain her belief in Conciliationism. So it 
is still true that, by Connie’s own lights, she is not rationally permitted to believe her view. Thus, 
there are only two possibilities for Connie: either Conciliationism is false but she can rationally 
believe it, or Conciliationism is true and she cannot rationally believe it. Neither possibility is good 
news for conciliationists. 
Furthermore, once Connie is aware that these are the only two possibilities—either 
Conciliationism is false or it is irrational to believe it—it no longer seems rationally permissible for 
Connie to retain her belief in Conciliationism. For, no matter which view about the epistemology of 
peer disagreement is correct, believing Conciliationism would amount to believing a defective view. 
So, no matter which view about how to rationally respond to peer disagreement is correct, it is still 
not rationally permissible for Connie to retain her belief in Conciliationism—not even on the 
proposed revision to Pittard’s defense. Conciliationists will therefore need some other defense against 
the SUP to come to the rescue in order for them to rationally believe their own view. 
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4. Pessimism about the Future 
How likely is it that future defenses of Conciliationism against the SUP will overcome the 
problem I’ve identified for existing defenses? This is a bit speculative—we are now considering 
defenses of Conciliationism that do not exist yet!—but it seems to me that the answer is: not very 
likely. Think about what such a defense would have to be like. It would need to establish that 
conciliationists can rationally believe Conciliationism in the face of disagreement from excellent 
philosophers by appealing to, and presupposing, all and only claims that are not themselves the 
subject of disagreement among excellent philosophers. This is a tall order. After all, the SUP is a 
fairly obvious problem for Conciliationism. If the solution to it were easy and straightforward, it 
probably would have been noticed by now, given the number of excellent philosophers invested in 
the peer disagreement literature. But it hasn’t. Thus, any future defense of Conciliationism against 
the SUP will likely require some fancy philosophical footwork. That is, it will likely appeal to, or 
presuppose, philosophical claims that are not obviously true. And non-obvious philosophical claims 
will likely be the subject of controversy among excellent philosophers. We know that (near) 
consensus among philosophers about any interesting philosophical claim is exceedingly difficult to 
come by. Achieving near consensus about matters concerning the fundamental standards of rational 
belief seems entirely hopeless. 
Perhaps the best hope conciliationists have to escape the force of the SUP is not by means 
of a philosophical defense of Conciliationism, but rather by a change in sociology. If, over time, all 
or most excellent philosophers convert to Conciliationism, then there would be no peer 
disagreement about it. So Conciliationism would not undermine itself and conciliationists could 
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rationally believe their own view. But such a mass conversion is not likely to happen any time soon.13 
Thus, if the line of reasoning presented in this paper is correct, then we cannot now rationally 
believe Conciliationism and this will likely be so for a very long time—for at least as long as anyone 
reading this is alive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13And if the mass conversion was made irrationally (e.g., by brainwashing), and you know this, then, plausibly, even a 
mass conversion would not insulate Conciliationism from the force of the SUP. 
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